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Abstract. This paper analyses how the Orthodox discourse colonised political dis-
course. To clarify what role the Russian Orthodox Church played in the creation of 
conservatism hegemony in Russian politics during 2006-2015, we analyse references 
to the Orthodox discourse found in the official political speeches, especially in dis-
cussions of economic, political, social and cultural issues that dominate the domestic 
and international agenda. Since national ideology is constructed in opposition to oth-
er nations, we restrict our analysis to criticism of Europe onlyб since it is one of the 
core elements of Russian conservatism. Critical discourse analysis was used as a 
methodological and theoretical framework for studying materials. As a result, we 
have identified three dichotomies in the criticism of European values: (1) religion vs 
secularism, (2) collectivism (sobornost’) vs individualism, (3) collective morality vs 
liberal moral pluralism. Within the period of 2006-2012, the Orthodox discourse has 
been appropriated in domestic agenda. After 2013, the Russian political discourse 
featured conservative rhetoric in the evaluation of European modernity through the 
two dichotomies: secularism vs. Orthodoxy and individualism vs. sobornost’. 
Keywords: postsecularism; Russian Orthodox Church; conservatism; geopolitics; 
discourse analysis. 
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Аннотация. В статье анализируется «колонизация» политического дискурса 
православным. Для того, чтобы выяснить, какую роль сыграла Русская Право-
славная Церковь в создании гегемонии консерватизма в российской политике в 
2006-2015 годах, мы анализируем ссылки на православный дискурс, встречаю-
щийся в официальных политических выступлениях, особенно в контексте об-
суждения экономических, политических, социальных и культурных эта линия 
является одним из основных элементов русского консерватизма. Критический 
дискурс анализ использовался в качестве методологической и теоретической 
рамки изучения материалов. В результате мы выявили три дихотомии в крити-
ке европейских ценностей: (1) религия и секуляризм, (2) коллективизм (собор-
ность) и индивидуализм, (3) коллективная мораль и либеральный моральный 
плюрализм. Было установлено, что в период с 2006 по 2012 православная рито-
рика использовалась политиками для обсуждения внутренней политики. После 
2013 года в российском политическом дискурсе использовалась консерватив-
ная риторика в оценке Европы с помощью двух дихотомий: секуляризм и пра-
вославие; индивидуализм и соборность. 
Ключевые слова: постсекулярность; Русская православная церковь; консерва-
тизм; геополитика; дискурс-анализ. 
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Introduction. After the end of the Cold 
War, religion started to be increasingly visible 
both publicly and politically, which attracted 
much scholarly attention (Beckford, 2012; 
Habermas, 2006). Political and international 
relations studies focused on religion as 
‘linked’ to ‘civilizational’ and ‘cultural identi-
ties’ (Hallward, 2008: 1). The emerging re-
gional centres of power (Brazil, India, South 
Africa, China, Arab countries, etc.) participate 
in global norm-making and impose their val-
ues, which are often hostile to neoliberal ones 
(Neuman, 1996). In these cases, religions be-
come an important element of anti-Western 
criticism and often play the key role in foster-
ing the national identity. Being a part of this 
trend, Russia questions the neoliberal order by 
using conservative ideology as a means of 
cultural and political revolt against the West-
ern domination (Petito, 2016). Given the fact 
that since the 1990s, the Russian Orthodox 
Church (ROC) has been collaborating with 
political elites and social groups in ideology 
construction and national identity building 
(Mitrofanova and Knox, 2014; Curanovic, 
2012), the Russian Orthodox Church has be-
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come one of the core conservative ideologues. 
Penetration of the Orthodox discource into 
political debates can be interpreted as a sign 
of conservatism in politics. 
A large body of research focuses pri-
marily on how the state employs Orthodoxy 
and the ROC to pursue national interests on 
the domestic and international arena (Cura-
novic, 2012; Blitt, 2011). However, few stud-
ies describe how and which conservative ide-
as were developed inside the ROC and how 
they later penetrated the political stage. This 
paper addresses this lacuna by analysing in 
what ways the official political discourses re-
contextualize the discourses of Orthodox con-
servatism aimed to criticitze European policy 
in the period between 2006 and 2015. As na-
tional Russian ideology is constructed through 
the opposition with other nations (Neuman, 
1996), we focus our analysis to the criticism 
of Europe as one of the core elements of Rus-
sian conservatism. Firstly, we consider the 
key tendencies of the state-ROC institutional 
rapprochement. We see the development of 
the ROC-state collaboration and the political 
context as two intertwined factors that even-
tually caused the integration of the religious 
and political discourses. Secondly, we analyse 
the main points of the criticism of Europe in 
the Orthodox conservative discourse. Thirdly, 
we examine how these Orthodox nodal dis-
courses are recontextualized in the official 
political discourse, for example, in official 
speeches and institutional practices. 
Methodology and methods. The criti-
cal discourse analysis (CDA) is used as a 
methodological framework to examine con-
servative criticism of Europe as an ideology. 
We consider criticism of European modernity 
as an 'interdiscursive event' (Fairclough, 
2005) that connects political and religious 
discourses within the conservative ideology. 
In this case interdiscursivtity means that Or-
thodox criticism of Europe is recontextualized 
in the political discourses in a frame of “colo-
nization-appropriation dialectic” (Fairclough, 
2005: 65). The conservative ideology fits well 
into the current political agenda and seen by 
politicians as the instrument of self-
legitimation (appropriation), and at the same 
time, the ROC gains to achieve political pow-
er for itself (colonization). 
In our study, we compare only official 
political and official religious speeches and 
texts, which are prepared in advance, and thus 
do not include the elements of spontaneous 
non-verbal communication, unlike other types 
of communication (Gee, 2005). With the view 
to our goal, we define both discourses as a 
corpus of written texts, which are “globally 
coherent … form a meaning unit, and not only 
a physical unit of continuous expression” (van 
Dijk, 1998: 195). Context is crucial for pro-
duction or interpretation of an utterance. It is 
necessary to consider international affairs and 
domestic political contexts in order to under-
stand the process of creating meanings and 
receivers’ interpretation of utterances.  
The analysis of interviews, speeches 
and sermons of the main ROC representatives 
(Patriarch Alexei, Patriarch Kirill, Metropoli-
tan Illarion (Alfeev), Archpriest Vsevolod 
Chaplin) brings to light the conservative criti-
cism of Europe in the official Orthodox dis-
course. All materials were taken from the of-
ficial web-site of the ROC – patriarchia.ru. 
Out of various political discourses we have 
chosen only the official political discourse as 
it is presented on the website kremlin.ru. Our 
analysis also included the materials of The 
State of the Nation Addresses (between 2006 
and 2015), Putin and Medvedev’s speeches at 
the Valdai Forum as well as the Concepts of 
Foreign Policy (2008, 2013). We look at both 
discourses as structured by the authority of 
the religious institution (Moscow Patriar-
chate) or political power while the positions 
and authorship of subordinated subjects are 
not important, because they mainly follow 
and express the dominant ideology.  
The fragments of the text containing 
references to Europe, liberalism, secularism, 
and conservatism were collected from web-
site patriarchia.ru and saved in separate files; 
the same procedure was applied to web-site 
kremlin.ru with the key words ‘Europe’, ‘civi-
lization’, ‘conservatism’, and ‘traditional val-
ues’. Then we defined and studied the nodal 
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discourses and the contexts in which they 
have emerged.  
Research results and discussion. 
State-ROC institutional rapprochement. 
The Russians had to deal with the fact 
that their country had lost its superpower sta-
tus (Smith, 1999) and sought to restore this 
status in particular through the concept of a 
special path. Moreover, in the situation of 
ideological vacuum, the juxtaposition of 
communist and moral Orthodox agenda al-
lowed the former Soviet citizens to obtain a 
new clear-defined identity by resorting to 
conservative rhetoric and supporting the ROC 
(Agadjanian, 2011). In its turn, the state fo-
cused on the role of tradition in the construc-
tion of the national identity as an efficient 
way to consolidate the nation (Dubin, 2004). 
Analysing the ROC-society-state cooperation, 
we can point out the three overlapping factors 
that contributed to the process of penetration 
of Orthodox conservatism into the public 
sphere and politics: (1) the ROC’s aspired to 
influence politics and public morality, (2) the 
state used Orthodoxy and conservative ideol-
ogy as instruments of self-legitimation and 
nation building; and (3) the society saw the 
ROC as the guardian of moral values and Or-
thodoxy as a bearer of the new national  
identity. 
The development of the ROC-state co-
operation went through two stages and result-
ed in the promotion of conservative values in 
the public sphere. After the collapse of the 
USSR and during the early 2000s, the ROC 
charged itself with the task of guarding the 
moral foundations of the society and tried to 
distance itself from politics (Mitrofanova 
2014). In 2000, the working group headed by 
the Metropolitan Kirill developed ‘The Bases 
of the Social Concept of the ROC’. The doc-
ument reveals the paradoxical contradiction 
within the ROC-state relation in this period. 
Although the Church highlights its separation 
from the state and politics, it also emphasizes 
the importance of the nation’s moral upbring-
ing in Orthodoxy. Adhering to this dualism, 
Patriarch Alexey carefully kept the ROC from 
being involved into politics but supported its 
social activities. In line with this policy, in 
2006, the ROC started training priests for the 
Army; in 2012 the mandatory course ‘The Ba-
ses of Religious Culture and Secular Ethics’ 
was introduced at Russian schools.  
After his enthronement in February, 
2009, Patriarch Kirill consolidated the ROC 
and put parishes under strict administrative 
control; he enhanced collaboration between 
the ROC and secular institutions (state, socie-
ty, and mass media). In 2011-2012, before 
and after the presidential election, the ROC 
used this opportunity to act as a political 
force, because both opposition leaders and 
state officials sought the ROC’s support (Fila-
tov, 2014; Knorre, 2014). As the ROC chose 
to stay loyal to the government, it obtained 
financial and social benefits, strong legal pro-
tection; as a result, the visibility of Orthodoxy 
in the public sphere increased. As a part of 
this trend, the document ‘The Core Values as 
the Basis of National Identity’, adopted at the 
XV WRPC meeting in 2011, listed “tradition-
al values” as crucial for the prosperity of Rus-
sian society. These values included the fol-
lowing: Orthodoxy and faith, sobornost', mo-
rality, family values, patriotism, ascesis and 
readiness for self-sacrifice, justice, freedom, 
and mercy (Bazisnye cennosti – osnova ob-
shchenacional'noj identichnosti 2011). This 
document is a key milestone of the ROC par-
ticipation in the nation-building process.  
Anti-Westernism in the Orthodox Dis-
course. 
As the analysis of publications on the 
web-site of the Moscow Patriarchate from 
2006 to 2015 shows, the Orthodox criticism 
of Europe is based on the dichotomy of tradi-
tionalist and post-modern values. There are 
three dichotomies that correspond to the three 
main lines of the criticism: (1) religion (Or-
thodoxy) vs secularism; (2) collectivism (sob-
ornost’) vs individualism; and (3) morality vs 
liberal moral pluralism. Religion, collectivism 
and morality thus become the nodal discours-
es within which Europe is judged. The dis-
course is constructed in a way to demonstrate 
the weakness of Europe and to highlight the 
advantages of the Russian historical past; it 
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emphasizes only the drawbacks of the latter, 
and the virtues of the former.  
The Orthodox conservatives describe 
religion as a necessary basis for the successful 
development of any society, Orthodoxy as a 
carrier of traditions and values is important 
for the prosperity of Russia and necessary for 
nation building. Secularism causes most of 
the European problems. The ‘crisis of civili-
zational identity’ in Europe happened because 
Europe had adopted the secular paradigm and 
rejected Christianity. This is the moral or spir-
itual crisis, the crisis of the ‘Godless society’, 
which in the future can lead to the destruction 
of Europe since Europe, renouncing Christi-
anity, is not immune to external expansion. 
The official Orthodox discourse recognizes 
only Christian Europe, which is the desired or 
‘imaginary Europe’ of the Soviet intellectuals 
(Yurchak, 2006). Christians of different de-
nominations should collaborate ‘to save the 
Europe that we know as a unique and original 
civilizational region that has equal relations 
with the other centres in the world” (Patriarch 
Kirill, 2010). 
The concept of sobornost’ as the social 
and spiritual unity of people in the church 
or/and in a secular community is used to criti-
cize individualism in European society. The 
essence and at the same time the main draw-
back of individualism is that a person is in-
stinctively driven by ‘natural and unnatural 
aspirations and desires’, ‘passions and vices’, 
which cannot be controlled by the society. 
Individualism implies that high importance is 
attached to material goods, comfort and con-
sumerism while spiritual and religious values 
or ideals are meaningless for individual citi-
zens. According to the ROC, instinctive be-
haviour, consumerism and inability to commit 
to spiritual values are incompatible with sus-
tainable development and lead to degradation 
and disintegration of society. Non-religious 
individualistic society is opposed to sobornoe 
society, which is moral, religious and stable.  
Conservative morality and the concept 
of traditional values underlie the moral criti-
cism of liberalism. According to the Orthodox 
conservatives, commitment to traditional 
moral values leads to prosperity and sustaina-
ble social development. ‘In the public sphere, 
society and the state should support and en-
courage morality, acceptable to the majority 
of citizens’ (Patriarch Alexey, 2007). Tradi-
tional values could be preserved and success-
fully transmitted from generation to genera-
tion only by means of tradition. The main ar-
gument for visibility of religion in the public 
sphere is that religion is one of the most effec-
tive ways to provide the continuity of tradi-
tion and preserve morality in the society.  
The main drawback of liberalism is its 
principle of religious neutrality in the public 
sphere. Liberalism rejects the Orthodox con-
cept of sin: ‘not God but the man is the meas-
ure of absolute truth, the human him- or her-
self is holy and pure” (Patriarch Alexey, 
2007). According to liberalism, human digni-
ty is the ability to act freely and to realize in-
dividual desires. The conservative criticism 
tends to show that people’s dignity and free-
dom, the way they are understood by the liber-
als, in fact mean quite the opposite: the loss of 
freedom and human dignity. Liberal freedom is 
freedom given to sinful human nature; it is ‘the 
freedom of expression of every desire, uncon-
trollable consumerism, the propaganda of per-
missiveness and of sexual immorality’ 
(Obrashchenie Vysshego Cerkovnogo Soveta 
Russkoj Pravoslavnoj Cerkvi, 2012). Thus, 
liberal morality produces weak-willed citizens, 
incapable of self-sacrifice, not taking into ac-
count the public good; liberal pluralism lead to 
moral crisis and degradation of society. 
According to the logic of the conserva-
tive discourse, sobornost' and traditional mor-
al values will enable Russia to overcome its 
social and economic crisis; they are the pillars 
of sustainable development of any society. 
From this perspective, European modernity, 
which relies on secularism, individualism and 
liberalism, is in deep spiritual crisis. The Or-
thodox intellectuals look at Europe through 
the lens of the Russian historical and cultural 
experience; their criticism of Europe is rooted 
in the Soviet past and in the post-Soviet trau-
ma and stems from the misunderstanding of 
the logic of European modernism (Stoeckl, 
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2011). The ROC perceives Russian future 
through its imperial past; the nineteenth-
century concepts of Christian theology and 
Russian religious philosophy serve as the de-
parture points for the ROC’s interpretation of 
European modernity. Russia’s historical isola-
tion in the twentieth century and the ‘Iron 
Curtain’ made it difficult for the Orthodox 
intellectuals to understand the path that Eu-
rope took after the Second World War. 
Orthodox conservatism in politics: from 
Orthodox Anti-Westernism to geopolitical 
confrontation. 
The Russian political elite pays special 
attention to ‘the identity of Russia and its 
place in the world after the collapse of the 
Soviet homeland and the loss of great power 
status’ (Smith, 1999:481). Identity discourse 
emphasizes Russia’s independence on the in-
ternational arena and explains Russia’s con-
frontation with the West (Bruning, 2012). In 
particulary, politicians elaborate identity dis-
course by apropriating Orthodox anti-
Westernism. In this paragraph we demon-
strate how this apropriation unfolds within 
two periods of the political discourse devel-
opment: 
(1) 2006-2012: the beginning of the pe-
riod was marked by Vladimir Putin’s speech 
in Munich (May, 2007), continued with the 
presidency of Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012) 
and ended with the anti-Putin opposition ral-
lies in 2011-2012; 
(2) 2013-2015: the conflict between 
Russia and the EU caused by the war in East-
ern Ukraine.  
The period of 2006-2007 became a turn-
ing point in the country’s foreign policy, 
when political leaders for the first time re-
ferred to the Orthodox discourse in the na-
tional identity discourse. The change coincid-
ed with the increasing global geopolitical con-
frontation caused by the intervention of the 
EU and US intervention into the domestic 
policy of the Third World countries: ‘the ex-
cessive usage of power in international af-
fairs’, ‘the whole legal system of one state ... 
has transgressed its national borders in all the 
spheres: economic, political and humanitari-
an’ (Putin, 2007). The other external factors 
included the confrontation between East and 
West, the regional destabilization in the Mid-
dle East, distrust in the international organiza-
tions, global inequality and the lack of justice 
in international relations.  
In a situation of tension of EU-Russian 
relations, Putin turned to the conservative 
rhetoric in the domestic agenda in order to 
stress the uniqueness of the Russian national 
identity. He turned to the concept that religion 
(especially Orthodoxy) initially played a core 
role in the history of Russia: ‘Russia has al-
ways been a patriarchal country; a very reli-
gious country … The Church has always 
played a significant role in Russia’ (Meeting 
of the International Discussion Club in Val-
dai, 2006). Following the official Orthodox 
discourse, Putin stressed that the ROC is one 
of the key social institutions that brings strict 
moral norms into the public sphere; thus, mo-
rality could not be separated from religion and 
spirituality (dukhvnost’). According to Putin, 
morality and religion are the key elements of 
the nation’s civil unity. Both the Orthodox 
clergy and Putin made references to the Rus-
sian history to prove the role of religion in the 
development of the country. 
Between 2007 to 2012, Dmitry 
Medvedev and Putin emphasized that con-
servative values were essential for the sover-
eignty of the country and its international sta-
tus. In 2010, ‘Edinaya Rossiya’ (‘United Rus-
sia’), a political party headed by Putin and 
Medvedev, asserted that Russian moderniza-
tion should be based on Orthodox faith (Blitt, 
2011). The following concepts of Orthodox 
discourses were recontectualized: ‘traditional 
values’, ‘strengthening of the spiritual and 
moral basis of society’ (President's Annual 
Address to the Federal Assembly 2008, 
2012). In political discourses this concepts 
make the chain of equivalence with the con-
cept of national sovereignty. For example, 
‘Russia should be a sovereign and influential 
country. Apart from sustainable development, 
we should ensure that our national and spir-
itual identity be preserved and save ourselves 
as a nation. To be and to remain Russia’ 
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(President's Annual Address to the Federal 
Assembly, 2012).  
‘The Concept of the Russian Foreign 
Policy of 2008’ introduced the idea of civili-
zational confrontation based on the difference 
of values (Concept of Foreign Policy, 2008). 
Discussions about Russia’s unique civiliza-
tional path implicitly refer to Europe as a 
threat to the Russian national identity, but in 
this period politicians did not expand on this 
idea yet. Moreover, despite the geopolitical 
confrontation and references to conservative 
rhetoric, the political discourse presented Eu-
rope as the role model: it was declared that 
Russia had inherited the European standards 
of social policy, human rights, civil society, 
and democracy (Putin, 2008; Putin, 2011). 
During the Ukrainian conflict, in 2013-
2015, the EU-Russian relations were in a deep 
crisis similar to the Cold War situation. 
Therefore, in 2013-2014 the Kremlin started 
to resort to conservative Orthodox ideology in 
the domestic and international agenda more 
intensively. In discourse of national identity, 
there were following references to the official 
Orthodox discourse in order to highlight spe-
cial path of Russian civilization: the ideas 
were expressed that traditional religions are a 
universal key to the welfare of society; that 
religion has to be visible in the public sphere; 
and that Orthodoxy, traditional values and 
morality are crucial for the Russian civiliza-
tion. Putin contrasted Russian readiness for 
self-sacrifice, collectivism, patriotism, with 
European individualism (Question-and-
Answer Session with Vladimir Putin, 2014). 
In 2013, Putin for the first time use con-
servative discourse about religion to criticize 
openly European modernity. Firstly, he re-
ferred to ‘Europe’s abandonment of its Chris-
tian roots’ and Orthodox criticism of the secu-
larism, which leads to ‘degradation, primitiv-
ism, a severe demographic and moral crisis’ 
(Meeting of the International Discussion Club 
Valdai 2013). The Concept of Foreign Policy 
of 2013 also underlines the importance of re-
ligious, spiritual and moral factors in interna-
tional relations (Concept of Foreign Policy, 
2013). In 2015, Putin stressed that the con-
frontation between Russia and Europe is es-
sentially a civilizational conflict (Meeting of 
the International Discussion Club Valdai, 
2015).  
In May, 2013, at the meeting with Patri-
arch Kirill, Sergey Lavrov, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, pointed out the increasing 
importance of civilizational identity as a fac-
tor of international relations, mentioned ‘mili-
tant secularism’, which does not recognize 
religious values, and stressed the role of Or-
thodoxy in the national development (Lavrov, 
2013). At the meeting with the members of 
the Russian International Affairs Council on 
June, 4 2014, Lavrov said that Europe, which 
lost its Christian roots, does not recognize 
‘the new Russia coming back to its traditional 
values rooted in Orthodoxy’ (Lavrov, 2104).  
Our analysis has shown that there are 
few examples of recontectualization of Or-
thodox discourses in politics; political dis-
courses remains secular and is mainly consti-
tuted by political and socio-economic issues. 
Since 2007, politicians have been recontectu-
alized Orthodox conservative ideas to speak 
of the domestic agenda, in discourses of na-
tional identity, and national sovereignty. For 
instance, presence of Orthodoxy in the public 
sphere, adherence to traditional values, and 
morality were supposed to help Russia re-
claim its status of the superpower. The dis-
courses of national identity, and national sov-
ereignty have become the ground for the 
emergence of discourse of anti-European crit-
icism, when political context changed after 
the Ukrainian crisis of 2013. Conservative 
rhetoric appeared in the evaluation of Europe 
through the two narratives, built on dichoto-
my, borrowed from the Orthodox discourse: 
secularism – Orthodoxy, individualism – sob-
ornost’.  
Conclusion. After Patriarch Kirill’s en-
thronization in 2009 and the rallies of 2011-
2012, the ROC obtained significant political 
power and strengthened its collaboration with 
the state and society. Metropolitan Kirill 
adopted a policy targeted at close collabora-
tion of the state and the Church, which in-
volved the penetration of Orthodox conserva-
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tism into the political discourse. In the Ortho-
dox conservative discourse, the anti-Western 
criticism is constituted by the three dichoto-
mies: religion – secularism; individualism – 
collectivism; collective morality – liberal 
moral pluralism. Until 2012, the conservative 
rhetoric had prevailed in the domestic policy 
and had been mainly used to define the Rus-
sian national identity. Later it was turned into 
a means to reclaim Russia’s status of a super-
power on the international arena. In 2013 – 
2015, when the Cold War tension between 
Russia and the EU escalated, the official po-
litical discourse referred to the Orthodox criti-
cism of European modernity by reproducing 
the ‘religion – secularism’, ‘individualism – 
collectivism’ dichotomies. Politicians pointed 
out the role of the Orthodox values as the core 
of the Russian national identity and referred 
to them to present the EU-Russian conflict as 
a conflict of civilizations.  
References to Orthodox conservatism 
do not prevail in the official political dis-
course, which has a secular nature. We as-
sume that conservative ideology is deeply 
embedded into Russian politics not on dis-
coursive level but on the level of social prac-
tices. Russian politicians distinguish between 
words and actions and, therefore, use soft 
power such as religious diplomacy and public 
institutions (‘Russkii Mir’) to promote Ortho-
dox conservatism. This can be a subject for 
further studies. 
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